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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellants Northview Motors, Inc. ("Northview") and 
Frank P. and Joann Cuda ("the Cudas"), principals and 
secured creditors of Northview, appeal from the order of the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania enforcing an agreement purporting to settle 
Northview's claims against Appellee Chrysler Motors, Inc. 
("Chrysler"). While administering these claims for the 
benefit of Northview's bankrupt estate, the Trustee entered 
into this agreement with Chrysler. 
 
Northview and Chrysler were parties to an automobile 
dealership franchise agreement, which Chrysler terminated 
in 1991. On September 20, 1991, Northview filed a 
voluntary bankruptcy petition in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 
11 U.S.C. S1101 et seq. The bankruptcy was subsequently 
converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding and a trustee of the 
bankrupt estate was appointed. 
 
On October 20, 1993, Northview, without the knowledge 
of the Trustee, filed the instant civil action against Chrysler.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Frank Cuda was originally a plaintiff to this action and asserted the 
same claims against Chrysler that were asserted by Northview. In March 
1995, the District Court granted summary judgment to Chrysler on all 
of Cuda's claims. The District Court subsequently amended the caption 
eliminating Frank Cuda as a named party. 
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The complaint asserted five claims: (1) violation of the 
federal Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. 
SS1221-1225 (the "ADDCA"); (2) violation of the 
Pennsylvania Board of Motor Vehicles Act, 63 Pa.C.S. 
SS818.1-818.28; (3) tortious interference with contract; (4) 
breach of the Uniform Commercial Code; and (5) breach of 
contract. After learning of this suit, the Trustee took 
possession of it for the benefit of Northview's bankrupt 
estate. On May 15, 1996, the Trustee agreed to settle 
Northview's claims in exchange for Chrysler's agreement to 
pay Northview $115,000 and to withdraw its claims against 
the bankrupt estate totaling $35,659.97. The settlement 
agreement expressly provided that it was "subject to 
bankruptcy court approval." (21a) 
 
Following the settlement, the District Court entered an 
order administratively closing the action. This order 
acknowledged that "the only matters remaining to be 
completed are the approval of the settlement by the 
bankruptcy court and the submission of a stipulation for 
dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 41(a)." (12a) Furthermore, 
the order specified that "nothing contained in this order 
shall be considered a dismissal or disposition of this action, 
and that should further proceedings therein become 
necessary or desirable, either party may initiate the same in 
the same manner as if this order had not been entered." 
(12a) Thereafter, the Trustee filed a motion to approve the 
settlement in the Bankruptcy Court. 
 
In response to the Trustee's motion for approval, 
Northview and the Cudas filed an objection to the 
settlement. In their objection, Northview and the Cudas 
asserted that the settlement amount was inadequate, and 
thus was not in the best interest of the estate. Additionally, 
Northview and the Cudas filed a motion pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. S554 to compel the Trustee to abandon the litigation 
on the grounds that the claims were of inconsequential 
value to the estate. In support of their motion, they alleged 
that: (1) the Cudas were the owners and subrogees of a 
secured claim against all the assets of Northview as a result 
of the Cudas' satisfaction of a secured claim of Mellon Bank 
against Northview in the amount of $610,123.25; and (2) 
because the settlement amount was less than this secured 
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claim, the claim would not provide for any distribution to 
unsecured creditors and thus was "of no value or benefit to 
the estate." (97a) 
 
The Bankruptcy Court ordered the Trustee to abandon 
the lawsuit to the Cudas. The Bankruptcy Court entered 
this order because it found: (1) that Mellon held a perfected 
security interest in Northview's claim against Chrysler prior 
to the filing of the petition; (2) that the Cudas were 
subrogated to that security interest when they satisfied 
Northview's $610,123.25 obligation to Mellon; (3) that the 
Cudas' interest exceeded the value of the lawsuit; and (4) 
that the lawsuit thus would not generate any funds for 
unsecured creditors. In re Northview Motors, Inc., 202 B.R. 
389 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996). The District Court affirmed 
this order, and the parties do not challenge before us the 
propriety of the order requiring abandonment to the Cudas. 
Because of its order regarding abandonment, the 
Bankruptcy Court never approved the proposed settlement 
agreement between the Trustee and Chrysler. Instead, the 
Bankruptcy Court denied Chrysler's motion for approval as 
moot. 
 
Chrysler then advised Northview and the Cudas that 
Chrysler was willing to complete the settlement agreement 
by forwarding a check to Northview in the amount of 
$115,000. Northview and the Cudas rejected the offer and 
demanded $3,500,000 to settle the action. In response, 
Chrysler filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. 
Northview, joined by the Cudas in their capacity as 
Northview's principals and secured creditors, opposed the 
motion. The District Court granted Chrysler's motion to 
enforce, concluding that court "approval [of the settlement 
agreement] became unnecessary when the abandonment 
occurred." Slip. Op. at 10. Northview and the Cudas now 
appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S1291. 
Chrysler has moved to dismiss the Cudas as appellants. 
 
I. 
 
As an initial matter, we must decide whether the Cudas 
have standing to appeal the order of the District Court 
granting Chrysler's motion to enforce the settlement 
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agreement. Ordinarily, those who were not parties to the 
proceeding below may not appeal an order of a district court.2 
See Caplan v. Felheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 
F.3d 828, 836 (3d Cir. 1995). However, this Court has 
recognized that a nonparty may bring an appeal when three 
conditions are met: (1) the nonparty has a stake in the 
outcome of the proceedings that is discernible from the 
record; (2) the nonparty has participated in the proceedings 
before the district court; and (3) the equities favor the 
appeal. See id. 
 
The first requirement is clearly satisfied. Because the 
Bankruptcy Court ordered the Trustee to abandon 
Northview's claims against Chrysler to the Cudas, the 
Cudas will be the recipients of any payment made by 
Chrysler in satisfaction of these claims. Thus, the Cudas 
have a substantial stake in the outcome of these 
proceedings. See Binker v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
977 F.2d 738, 745 (3d Cir. 1992) (potential recipients of 
settlement agreement have substantial stake in litigation). 
 
Turning to the second requirement, we note that the 
Cudas filed a brief in the district court opposing Chrysler's 
motion to enforce the settlement agreement. We have 
previously held that this level of participation is sufficient 
to satisfy the second requirement. See Krebs Chrysler- 
Plymouth Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 496 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (nonparty's filing of brief and arguing in support 
of a party's position satisfied participation requirement). 
Additionally, we note that the Cudas participated 
significantly in the related abandonment proceedings before 
the Bankruptcy Court. 
 
Finally, we address the equities of allowing this appeal. 
The Cudas have an interest in litigating whether or not the 
settlement agreement signed by the Trustee is binding. If 
the settlement agreement is not binding, the Cudas may 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although the District Court dismissed Frank Cuda from the action, he 
does not appeal that order. Rather he asserts standing for purposes of 
this appeal as a party to whom Northview's claims have been 
abandoned. Because of this procedural posture, we conclude that Frank 
Cuda should be treated as a nonparty for purposes of this appeal. Joann 
Cuda was never a party to the instant suit. 
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litigate the claims on remand or pursue a higher settlement 
amount than that agreed to by the Trustee. To the extent 
that the Cudas' secured debt is satisfied by this recovery 
from Chrysler, Northview and its other creditors are better 
off. 
 
Chrysler's argument that the equities favor denying the 
Cudas an opportunity to pursue this appeal rests primarily 
on its contention that the Cudas have taken inconsistent 
positions as to the value of the claims. In support of this 
contention, Chrysler points to the following positions: 
 
       1. In objecting to the proposed settlement, the Cu das 
       indicated that their attorney, who has extensive 
       experience in litigating actions between franchisers and 
       dealers, was prepared to testify that the settlement was 
       inadequate by several hundred thousand dollars. 
 
       2. In their motion for abandonment, Northview and the 
       Cudas asserted that "[b]ecause the proposed settlement 
       is significantly less that the secured claim [in the 
       amount of $610,123.25] owed to Movants Frank P. 
       Cuda and Joann Cuda, there is no equity in said claim 
       which would provide for any distribution to unsecured 
       creditors. The estate therefore has no interest in said 
       property and said claim should be abandoned." (97a) 
 
       3. In responding to Chrysler's offer to consummate  the 
       settlement, the Cudas insisted that their claim had a 
       value of $3.5 million. 
 
As the parties moving for abandonment, the Cudas had 
the burden of showing that Northview's claims against 
Chrysler were of inconsequential value to the estate in light 
of their own security interest. Given the size of that security 
interest, the Cudas' assertion that the claims would not 
provide for distribution to unsecured creditors' position is 
consistent with their representation that the settlement was 
inadequate by several hundred thousand dollars. Thus, 
these statements should not preclude the Cudas from 
prosecuting this appeal. 
 
While it is true that the Cudas' $3.5 million settlement 
demand is in tension with their position during the 
abandonment proceeding, we must keep in mind that it 
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was a settlement demand and not a position taken to 
secure action from a court. We leave for another day 
whether the Cudas should, as a result of their position in 
the abandonment proceeding, be estopped from recovering 
more than $610,123 on Northview's claims against 
Chrysler. We hold only that the Caplan factors are satisfied 
and that the Cudas have standing to pursue this appeal. 
 
II. 
 
We now turn to the issue of whether the District Court 
erred in compelling the Cudas to consummate the 
settlement agreement. The legal effect of an agreement is a 
question of law over which we exercise plenary review. See 
Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 881 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
As our starting point, we examine Section 363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Section 363(b)(1) restricts a trustee's 
ability to use, sell, or lease estate property out of the 
ordinary course of business. Pursuant to Section 363(b)(1), 
the trustee may do so only after notice and a hearing. See 
11 U.S.C. S363(b)(1).3 We have interpreted Section 363 to 
require both a hearing and court approval. See In re Martin, 
91 F.3d 389, 395 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996). Thus, we must 
examine the Trustee's settlement agreement with Chrysler 
and determine whether it involves the (1) use or sale of (2) 
estate property (3) out of the ordinary course of business. 
 
As the Bankruptcy Code and its legislative history 
demonstrate, Northview's claims against Chrysler 
constituted estate property within the meaning of Section 
363 prior to the court-ordered abandonment. Section 541(a) 
of the Code provides that the commencement of a case 
creates an estate and mandates that "all legal [and] 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case" constitute property of that 
estate. See 11 U.S.C. S541. As the legislative history of this 
section recognizes, "[t]he scope of this paragraph is broad. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 363(b)(1) provides that "[t]he trustee, after notice and a 
hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of 
business, property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. S363. 
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It includes all kinds of property, including tangible or 
intangible property, causes of action . . . and all other forms 
of property currently specified in section 70a of the 
Bankruptcy Act. . . ." H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, at 367 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323 (emphasis 
added); see also Integrated Solutions, Inc. v. Service Support 
Specialties, 124 F.3d 487, 490-91 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Additionally, the Trustee's act of agreeing to settle 
Northview's claims against Chrysler constituted a sale of 
that claim. See In re Telesphere Communications, Inc., 179 
B.R. 544, 552 n.7. (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994) ("There is no 
difference in the effect on the estate between the sale of a 
claim (by way of assignment) to a third party and a 
settlement of the claim with the adverse party."). Finally, we 
note that this act was outside the scope of Northview's 
ordinary course of business prior to the filing of 
bankruptcy. See Martin, 91 F.3d at 394 (noting that 
trustee's settlement of debtor's breach of contract claim 
"ventured beyond the domain of transactions . . . 
encountered in the ordinary course of business"). 
 
Thus, the Bankruptcy Code contemplates notice, a 
hearing, and bankruptcy court approval in this situation. 
These requirements afford due process protections to 
parties interested in the disposition of the estate but who 
did not themselves enter into the settlement agreement. 
"[T]his schema [of notice, a hearing, and approval] is 
intended to protect both debtors and creditors (as well as 
trustees) by subjecting a trustee's actions to complete 
disclosure and review by the creditors of the estate and by 
the bankruptcy court." Martin, 91 F.3d at 395.4 Relying on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 provides the procedure for the required court 
approval. Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a) states in pertinent part that: 
 
       On motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court 
       may approve a compromise or settlement. Notice shall be given to 
       creditors, the United States trustee, the debtor, and indentured 
       trustees as provided in Rule 2002 and to any other entity the court 
       may direct. 
 
On appeal, Chrysler alleges that this rule violates the Bankruptcy 
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. S2075, which provides in relevant part 
that: 
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Section 363, we have held that a contract providing for use 
or sale of estate property outside the regular course of 
business is unenforceable absent court approval. In re Roth 
American, 975 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
Chrysler disputes the application of this well established 
principle here on the basis of a three step argument. It first 
asserts that the settlement agreement became legally 
binding on the parties to the agreement upon its execution 
but that its consummation was subject to the satisfaction 
of a condition subsequent -- bankruptcy court approval. 
Second, having thus established to its satisfaction that the 
settlement agreement was binding on the Trustee from the 
time of its execution, Chrysler insists that the Cudas were 
similarly bound because their title was "derivative" from the 
Trustee's and the abandonment order negated the need for 
bankruptcy court approval. As an alternative to this second 
step, Chrysler further contends that the condition 
subsequent should be excused because it was the Cudas' 
application for abandonment that caused the condition to 
fail. 
 
Given our view of the appropriate analysis, we may 
assume, without deciding, that an agreement within the 
scope of S 363 is effective on execution subject to conditions 
subsequent -- notice, a hearing, and a court determination 
that the agreement is in the best interests of the estate. 
Moreover, we may also assume, without deciding, that the 
person to whom title reverts following an abandonment 
takes a derivative title. Thus, we assume, for example, that 
had the abandonment followed a court approval, the Cudas 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general 
       rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the 
       practice and procedure in cases under Title 11. Such rules shall 
not 
       abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. 
 
Chrysler is correct that, as a matter of law, Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a), 
a rule of procedure, cannot, by itself, create a substantive requirement 
of judicial approval of the Trustee's settlement of Northview's claims 
against Chrysler. However, we adhere to our ruling in Martin that 
Section 363 of the Code is the substantive provision requiring court 
approval. See Martin, 91 F.3d at 394 n.2. 
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would have taken the claim subject to the settlement 
agreement. Even with these assumptions in Chrysler's 
favor, however, we cannot sanction the action taken by the 
District Court. 
 
Under Chrysler's condition subsequent analysis, the 
Trustee immediately prior to the order of abandonment 
could not have been forced to consummate the settlement 
agreement absent court approval. If the Cudas stepped into 
the Trustee's shoes with the entry of the abandonment 
order, it necessarily followed that they could not be forced 
to consummate the agreement absent court approval and, 
as the District Court recognized, there has been none. 
 
The District Court was able to reach a contrary 
conclusion only because it, like Chrysler, viewed the 
abandonment as removing the claim from the bankrupt's 
estate and that removal as obviating the necessity of court 
approval. Removal of the claim from the estate did indeed 
render Section 363 inapplicable and, as a result, any 
settlement to which the Cudas had agreed would be 
enforceable against them without court approval. The 
difficulty with this approach, however, is that the 
settlement the District Court ordered the Cudas to 
consummate was not a settlement to which they had 
agreed. 
 
It must be remembered that the Cudas concededly 
started out with a property interest. Having satisfied 
Northview's $610,123 obligation to Mellon, they had a 
perfected lien interest in the claim against Chrysler. That 
property interest could be impaired only with the Cudas' 
consent or in accordance with the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code. The District Court, while concluding that 
the claims were no longer subject to the Code following 
abandonment, nevertheless determined that the settlement 
could be enforced against the Cudas by virtue of the 
Trustee's act of agreement. This conclusion was foreclosed 
by Section 363, however. The Trustee's authority was 
limited as a matter of law to agreeing to settle subject to 
court approval. This condition subsequent was never 
satisfied as there has been no judicial determination that 
their interest must yield to the best interests of the estate. 
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As noted above, Chrysler offers an alternative argument 
as to why judicial approval of the settlement agreement is 
unnecessary. Because the Bankruptcy Court is now 
incapacitated from passing on the fairness of the settlement 
agreement, Chrysler argues that the satisfaction of the 
condition subsequent should be excused under normal 
contract principles. Chrysler emphasizes that the Cudas 
are the parties against whom the agreement is sought to be 
enforced and that the Cudas' abandonment application was 
responsible for the settlement not being approved. We 
conclude, however, that the Cudas did no more than they 
were legally entitled to do as the real parties in interest. See 
11 U.S.C. S 554(b) (authorizing party in interest to request 
a court order of abandonment of a particular property). 
Additionally, we note that the Bankruptcy Court and the 
District Court recognized their status as the real parties in 
interest in approving the abandonment. We do not believe 
the Cudas can be penalized for taking actions expressly 
sanctioned by the Code and the appropriate courts. See In 
re Martin, 91 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that trustee 
could not have breached settlement agreement pending 
court approval by engaging in behavior violative of the 
agreement since Bankruptcy Court formally endorsed 
trustee's course of action). Thus, we decline to hold that the 
Cudas' petition excused satisfaction of the condition 
subsequent and instead conclude the settlement agreement 
signed by the Trustee and Chrysler is not enforceable as 
against the Cudas. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the Order of the 
District Court enforcing the settlement and remand for 
further proceedings. 
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